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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN D. WATSON, 
vs. 
CAMILLE K. WATSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 960344-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
i 7K ^1-3(2X0 (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
requiring the sale of the marital home based upon the conclusion that Camille Watson was 
cohabitating with Jerry Talbot. "[T]he determination of whether given circumstances 
i ^Habitation. . i in n.alil> ,i mixed question nl III mil l,i , . ." v. 
Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). While appellate courts are not bound by the 
"conclusion" reached by the trial court, a trial court's findings of fact "will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous". rtaadow. 707 P.2d at 671; Sigg v. Sigg. 9u: . > d 
1 
908, 918 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah 
App. 1991)). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(6) (1992) 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual 
contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Camille K. Watson appeals from a final order of the Honorable Howard H. 
Maetani, Fourth District Court, terminating alimony and requiring the sale of the marital 
home pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(9) (R. 228-247). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
A Decree of Divorce between appellee, John Watson, and appellant, Camille 
Watson, was entered on November 12,1992 (R. 25-31). The parties, at that time, had 
three minor children. In the decree, the parties were awarded joint legal custody while 
Camille Watson was granted physical custody provided that John Watson received liberal 
and reasonable visitation rights. John Watson was ordered to pay alimony in the amount 
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of $250.00 per month until Camille Watson either remarries or cohabitates with another 
person (R. 25). In addition, Camille Watson was awarded the marital home until she 
moves or the youngest child reaches the age of eighteen—provided that she did not remarry 
or cohabitate with another person (R. 30). 
On or about November 27, 1995, John Watson filed with the Fourth District Court 
a Motion for an Order to Show Cause alleging that Camille Watson was cohabitating with 
Jerry Talbot, and requesting an order terminating alimony payment and requiring the sale 
of the marital home pursuant to the Divorce Decree (R. 57). An Order to Show Cause was 
signed that same day by Judge Howard Maetani (R. 87). 
On February 1, 1996, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before Judge Maetani 
(R. 167-78; 2/1/96 Transcript). At the close of evidence, Judge Maetani took the matter 
under advisement and requested that counsel submit proposed findings of fact (2/1/96 Tr. 
at 217-18). 
On April 8, 1996, the trial court issued a memorandum decision terminating 
Camille Watson's right to alimony and ordering the sale of the marital home (R. 209-224). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was signed by the trial court on May 2, 1996 
(R. 228-247); also on May 2, 1996, Camille Watson filed a Notice of Appeal and this 
appeal followed (R. 252). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 1, 1996, an evidentiary hearing on an order to show cause filed by the 
plaintiff/appellee, John Watson ("John"), was held before Judge Maetani in the Fourth 
District Court. The central issue at the hearing was whether the defendant/appellant, 
Camille Watson ("Camille"), was cohabitating with Jerry Talbot in violation of the parties 
1992 divorce decree, which provided that if Camille remarried or cohabitated with another 
person, then her right to alimony would be terminated and her right to reside in the marital 
home would be dissolved. Several individuals testified at the hearing as follows: 
A. Testimony of Robert N. Goode 
Robert Goode testified that he was a private investigator with fifteen years of 
experience (seven years in surveillance experience in cohabitation cases) (2/1/96 Tr. at 9, 
14). Goode testified that he had been hired by John to perform a "skip trace" on Jerry 
Talbot ("Talbot") and broad surveillance on the residence of Camille located at 1668 
North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah ("Camille's address") (2/1/96 Tr. at 15, 17). A 
"skip trace" consists of "locating the primary residence of an individual" (2/1/96 Tr. at 
11). 
Early in Goode's testimony he was asked by John's counsel about a "skip trace" on 
Talbot and he responded: " . . . [W]e tried to verify whether or not Mr. Talbot had any 
other residences available to him. At the time that we were employed to do this Mr. 
Talbot had no other residences" (2/1/96 Tr. at 17). Camille's counsel objected to this 
statement on foundation because more information as to "what [Goode] did to determine 
4 
whether [Talbot] has other residences or not" was needed (2/1/96 Tr. at 17). At this stage, 
the objection was sustained (2/1/96 Tr. at 17). 
However, later in Goode's testimony-following the introduction of detailed 
foundation evidence—he was allowed to render his opinion concerning the results of the 
"skip trace" he had conducted on Talbot (2/1/96 Tr. at 38-39). Goode's opinion, based 
upon his ten month investigation and surveillance activities, was that "Talbot was 
residing" at Camille's address during the period of December, 1994, to November, 1995; 
and that Camille and Talbot had a "family relationship" (2/1/96 Tr. at 39). 
Goode's opinion was based upon the information gained from the following 
investigative procedures: From December 17, 1994, through early February, 1995, Goode 
personally conducted surveillance on Camille's home (2/1/96 Tr. at 15, 18). Goode used a 
stationary video surveillance system at Camille's address from February, 1995, through 
April, 1995 (2/1/96 Tr. at 18). From April, 1995, through October, 1995, Goode 
personally conducted random checks on Camille's address; and that a stationary video 
surveillance system was again used during the period of October through November, 1995 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 18). 
Goode testified to the following information concerning the location of Talbot's 
primary residence and whether he and Camille were "cohabitating": One, Talbot was 
present at the Watson home each night Goode personally surveilled the residence (2/1/96 
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Tr. at 18)1; and that Talbot was never present at his mother's home in West Valley City 
during a three-four month period in early 1995, when Goode conducted surveillance on 
the house a couple of times per week (2/1/96 Tr. at 62-63). Two, Goode observed Talbot 
changing clothes in the master bedroom (2/1/96 Tr. at 19). Three, Goode testified that 
Talbot had access to the Watson home on a regular basis, and that he frequently was 
engaged in activities around the house. (2/1/96 Tr. at 24-26). 
For example: Talbot used a garage door opener to access the home and he parked 
his cars in the garage (2/1/96 Tr. at 20). Talbot worked on his car in that garage (Id.). 
Talbot frequently used Camille's car (Id. at 23). Talbot, on numerous occasions, was in 
the home when Camille was not present and at times the Watson children were not present 
either (Id. at 31-32). Talbot cleaned the garage, worked in the yard, mowed the lawn, 
washed the cars, entered the home without knocking, returned to the home late at night 
when no lights were on, earned groceries into the home, and every other weekend, Talbot 
was present at the home with "dark-haired" children who were later identified as his 
children from a previous marriage (2/1/96 Tr. at 25, 26, 32, 37, 41-42, 57). 
Four, Goode found two pieces of regular mail and other pieces of "junk" mail 
addressed to Talbot at Camille's address during trash can searches (2/1/96 Tr. at 27, 60-
61). In addition, Goode traveled to Wendover, Talbot's former place of residence, spoke 
'Later, testimony regarding the video surveillance between January and March of 1995, indicated 
that there were a few days when Talbot was not present at the Watson home, but that on any many 
other days, he was present at the home and often spent the night there (2/1/96 Tr. at 50-58). 
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with his prior apartment manager, and at some point learned that Talbot had left 
Camille's address as a forwarding address (2/1/96 Tr. at 36). Goode also spoke with a 
former employer of Talbot's and was told that Talbot was using Camille's address on his 
W-2 form (2/1/96 Tr. at 30). 
Five, Goode testified that he had observed Talbot and Camille together in the 
master bedroom, late at night, and with Camille wearing a white robe; that he had further 
observed Talbot follow Camille into the master bath; and that he also saw the shades on 
the window close (2/1/96 Tr. at 41). Goode also testified that he found an empty box of 
condoms in the trash can at the home (2/1/96 Tr. at 33). 
B. Testimony of Craig Hilton 
Craig Hilton lives directly across the street from Camille (2/1/96 Tr. at 73). He 
testified that he first saw Talbot two years prior to the hearing at Camille's home; and that 
he first met Talbot at a church social at which Talbot had attended with the Watson's 
daughter, Shawnie, approximately a year prior to the hearing date (2/1/96 Tr. at 74-75). 
Hilton further testified that he has noticed Talbot in several different cars over the 
past two years and that one of those cars was a red corvette (2/1/96 Tr. at 76). Hilton 
stated that he had seen Talbot park the car in Camille's garage and that he had seen the car 
parked there overnight, and that Talbot had washed the corvette in Camille's driveway 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 75-76). In addition, Hilton testified that Talbot also drove a White Grand 
Am and a Ford Bronco; and that Camille drove a Ford Taurus with Talbot as a passenger 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 76-77). 
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Hilton testified that during the past two years he had seen Talbot: go to the 
mailbox once or twice; working in Camille's yard—including mowing the lawn on a 
regular basis; carrying groceries into Camille's house and taking the trash outside; riding 
bicycles with Camille; vacationing with Camille; arguing with Camille in her garage 
where he heard Camille beg Talbot not to leave because she loved him; talking with 
Shauna Farnsworth, a friend with whom Camille exercised weekly (2/1/96 Tr. at 78, 79, 
80, 83-84, 85-86, 87). Hilton testified further that he had seen Talbot take a duffel bag 
into the house; and that he had seen Talbot's car leave Camille's house in the morning 
between seven and eight a.m. which caused him to assume that Talbot had spent the night 
at Camille's (2/1/96 Tr. at 80, 86-87). However, Hilton also testified that there had been 
periods of weeks where he hadn't seen Talbot at Camille's house; and that Talbot, when 
present, could, on occasion, have left Camille's after he went to bed (2/1/96 Tr. at 90). 
Hilton testified that he last saw Talbot "a couple of weeks" before the hearing 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 79). Finally, Hilton testified that it was his opinion that when Talbot was 
present he was living with Camille (2/1/96 Tr. at 92). 
C. Affidavit of Russell Ware 
During the hearing, an affidavit of Russell Ware, a United States Postal Service 
employee, was submitted to the trial court. The affidavit stated that Ware has, on an 
occasional basis, delivered mail to Talbot at Camille's address (1668 North 390 West, 
Pleasant Grove) since early 1995 (2/1/96 Tr. at 96-97). 
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D. Testimony of Shauna Farnsworth 
Shauna Farnsworth, a long-time friend and exercise partner of Camille's, testified 
that she visits Camille's home 3 to 4 times a week (2/1/96 Tr. at 99). She testified that 
Camille and Talbot had been dating for two years and that she had seen Talbot in 
Camille's home approximately six times (2/1/96 Tr. at 101). She testified that Camille 
drives a Taurus and that Talbot has driven a Corvette and a Grand Am both of which he 
has parked in the garage (2/1/96 Tr. at 101). She also testified that she and Camille have 
had conversations about Jerry—particularly at times when Camille and Talbot had been 
arguing or Camille was angry (2/1/96 Tr. at 102). In addition, Famsworth testified that 
Camille and Talbot had taken week-end trips together (2/1/96 Tr. at 102-03). Farnsworth 
also testified that she had never seen Talbot or any of his possessions in the master 
bedroom and that she did not believe he was living with Camille (2/1/96 Tr. at 110-11). 
E. Testimony of Jerry Talbot 
Jerry Talbot testified that he resides at 3234 South 4000 West, West Valley City, 
Utah (2/1/96 Tr. at 122). Talbot testified that this was his mother's home and that he had 
been living there since September of 1994 (2/1/96 Tr. at 126). Talbot testified that his 
household furnishings were currently in storage (2/1/96 Tr. at 136). Talbot testified that 
in the past two years he has also resided in Wendover, Nevada, and Illinois, but that he 
receives mail at several addresses (2/1/96 Tr. at 123). 
Talbot stated that he received his mail at his mother's house in West Valley City 
and the defendant produced evidence to that effect (Defendant's exhibits 7-27) (2/1/96 Tr. 
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at 153-59). Talbot testified that Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, an out-of-state bank statement 
addressed to him at Camille's house, was his and was related to a balance on a safety 
deposit box; and that his 1994 W-2 form from his work at Farenco was also addressed to 
him at Camille's house (2/1/96 Tr. at 124-25). He testified that he had these documents 
sent to Camille's rather than the West Valley City address-his mother's home where he 
claims to have resided since September of 1994-because he trusted Camille to forward 
him the documents whereas his mother would not (2/1/96 Tr. at 125-26). 
Talbot testified that he was formerly employed by Farenco Industrial, a 
construction firm, and that he was frequently required to travel (2/1/96 Tr. at 123). Talbot 
testified that on the date of the hearing he did not have a bank account nor did he share 
one with Camille—nor did he have any other joint finances or property with her; and that 
he was not sure whether he had an account in December, 1994 (2/1/96 Tr. at 123-24, 130, 
144, 160-61). Talbot stated that he operates on a "cash" basis (2/1/96 Tr. at 131). 
Talbot testified that he and Camille had been dating "a little over two years" and 
that they were "good friends" who had a "trusting type relationship" (2/1/96 Tr. at 125, 
127). Talbot testified that on most weeks he arrives at the Watson home on Friday 
evening and leaves either Sunday evening or often Monday morning (2/1/96 Tr. at 160). 
Talbot also testified that he's "never made an unannounced visit to Mrs. Watson's house" 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 147). However, Talbot also admitted: that he parked his Corvette and 
Grand Am in Camille's garage using a garage door opener he had in his vehicle when in 
Pleasant Grove, and that he has cleaned that garage and fixed the opener (2/1/96 Tr. at 
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128-29, 142), Talbot said that he had - Hriven Camille5 purchased groceries and 
cooked for her and the Watson children, worked in the yard, collected the mail, taken out 
the trash, done the laundry and the dishes (but not his laundry because his mother washes 
wiothes at "hom« 
children and Camille camping and fishing (2/1/96 Tr. at 127, 129, 131, *37, 138-40, 142, 
143). Talbot testified that his television set was in the master bedroom and his stereo in 
one of the children's room, 'that he had purchased a
 weecj-eater for the yam, 
had bought several items for Camille's children for Christmas, birthdays, or if they 
"need[ed] something and Camille [didn't] have the money" (2/1/96 Tr. at 133, 141). 
Talbot agreed that his children have "stayed-over" at Camille's once or twice a 
mont! respective children ha ;::l sp i nt 
Christmas in 1994 together at the Watson home (2/1/96 Tr. at 134). In addition, Talbot 
testified that he had spent the night at Camille's, left for work from Camille's, and had 
itl I tl in I:::: P'1 ats :: II :hildi ei i 1 i :! i i Can lille as i it ;:: t at 
home (2/1/96 Tr. at 129). He testified that "most often" when he spent the night, he slept 
i couch in the living room, but that he had slept in the bedroom "on top of the covers" 
Il "". - i ) . 
x. i estimony of Camille Watson 
Camille Watson testified that she has never lived with Talbot (2/1/96 Tr. at 195). 
Camille also testified that Talbot never gave her money but has paid for groceries, on 
^1/96 Tr fhat she an- ::I I alt: • ::: ill: ;::l : i i ::: 1 : 1 l a i ai ij f oh it ac :()i it its :>r 
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property (Id.); that Talbot, when present, had access to the home, including the kitchen, 
bathroom, and garage (2/1/96 Tr. at 182); that Talbot has been in the home with the 
children at times when she has been away, but that "it could be the case" that she has 
driven off with her children leaving Talbot in the home doing yard work, washing his car, 
and going in and out the front door (2/1/96 Tr. at 185, 187-88); that Talbot has parked all 
of his cars, at one time or another, in her garage (2/1/96 Tr. at 185); that during a period 
of four months Talbot's children were at the home every other week-end; (2/1/96 Tr. at 
183-84); that she and Shauna Farnsworth usually exercise during the day (2/1/96 Tr. at 
190); that she never gave Talbot access to a garage door opener but that she or the 
children would always open the garage for him (2/1/96 Tr. at 190-193); that she was the 
owner of the Bronco which Hilton testified he had seen Talbot driving (2/1/96 Tr. at 
196). 
G. Testimony of Rowella Talbot 
Rowella Talbot ("Mrs. Talbot"), Jerry Talbot's mother, testified that Talbot has 
lived with her since November of 1994; that she usually does his laundry; that he spends 
"a lot of time" with Camille; that she had been receiving mail for Talbot for a long period 
of time before he moved-in; that Talbot spent Christmas of 1994 with her (2/1/96 Tr. at 
205-212). 
H. Testimony of Sherry Clements 
Sherry Clements, Camille9 s older sister, testified: that she visits Camille 4 to 5 
times per week to check on her, baby sit or exchange clothes; that she knows Talbot but 
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personal proper the Watson home nor has he ever answered 
the phone when she has called; that she has seen Talbot at the Watson home on week-
days; and that in the past two years she has not had an overnight visit with Camille at the 
Watsu i I! u n r II ' II «»( Il mi . i l l "III i II i). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Camille Watson and Jerry Talbot were "cohabitin« " did 
Camille and Talbot share a common residency in the Watson's marital home and did they 
engage in sexual contact indicative of a conjugal relationship. Under Utah Code 
of common residency, once that residency is established by John Watson, then Camille 
Watson has the burden of proving that the relationship was without sexual contact. 
i equired sale of "the marital home, it is unclear who has the 
burden of proof relating to sexual contact. Nonetheless, appellee has marshaled the 
evidence and will demonstrate to this Court that the trial court's findings and conclusion 
of sexual contact was sufficient. 
The trial court's findings of fact have been largely undisputed bv .ippellanl, who 
has not properly marshaled the evidence nor demonstrated clear error. Therefore, this 
Court should assume that the findings are correct and proceed to an examination of the 
trial court's application of those facts to the law. In addition, appellee has marshaled the 
evidence and will demonstrate the sufficiency of the trial court's findings. 
Finally, an application of the facts to the law amply supports the trial court's 
conclusion of cohabitation: that Camille and Talbot shared, and intended to share, a 
common residence for more than a brief period of time; and that they engaged in sexual 
contact of a conjugal nature. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision 
terminating alimony and requiring the sale of the marital home. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS ARE NOT 
"CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" 
A. Standard of Review 
Appellant opens her argument by claiming 'the trial court abused its discretion and 
committed error in its findings of fact" (Br. of Appellant at 15). Although the basic 
contention of appellant's argument is that the trial court committed error in concluding 
that Talbot and Camille shared a common residence, appellant, in reality, is challenging 
the trial court's 'findings of fact."2 While this Court is not bound by the "conclusion" 
^t should be noted that appellant never mentions the trial court's formal "findings of fact" in her 
statement of facts. Instead she questions only the trial court's summary of the evidence; and does 
so without demonstrating how any error in the summary resulted in error in the "findings", which 
under appellant's argument would, of course, have led to the erroneous "conclusion" by the trial 
court under the abuse of discretion standard of review in "cohabitation" cases. 
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reached by the trial court as to whether a given set of facts constitute cohabitation, this 
Court will only disturb the trial court's factual findings (i.e., the given set of facts) where 
they are "clearly erroneous'9—or so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
Haddow v. Haddow. ^ m /. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). See also, Siggv. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 918 
(Utah App. 1995) (citation omitted). 
Moreover, when challenging
 a finding oi appellant must properly "marshal 
the evidence" or this Court will not address the challenge. See Robb v. Anderson. 863 
P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993) citing Gillmorev Gillmore, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 
App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 F.2d P.2d 1278 (Utah iy«8) ("We review the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm, if th - enable basis 
for doing so"). Marshaling the evidence requires that appellant list all of the evidence 
supporting the finding and then appellant must "demonstrate that the marshaled evidence 
a light most favorable to the decision" Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 
(Utah App. 1992); and if appellant fails to marshal the evidence properly, then this Court 
il mi ui11* I assume lllii; I Hidings ol l.i I an niiiiii ml and pmuu l I in determinate in it ::: i til lie 
accuracy of the trial court's conclusions of law and application of that law. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). 
B. Appellant has Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence. 
Appellant has not properly marshaled the evidence. She has not listed all of the 
evidence supporting the findings, nor has she demonstrated the insufficiency of the 
findings having viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision. Moreover, 
appellant cites no legal authority in support of her argument nor does she adequately cite 
to the trial record in support of the factual errors she claims. Therefore, this Court should 
assume the record supports the findings and proceed to a review of the trial court's 
application of the facts to the law. 
C. The Factual Findings are Supported by the Evidence. 
Regardless of appellant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, the evidence 
presented at trial is sufficient to support the trial court's factual findings. Appellee has 
listed all of the evidence in his Statement of Relevant Facts, and will demonstrate the lack 
of clear error in those findings. A copy of the trial court's "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" is included in the Addenda at Tab 1. 
Finding number one states that a former spouse's right to alimony terminates upon 
cohabitation with another person (Tab 1 at 12). This is a correct statement of the law. 
See, Utah Code. Ann. Section 30-3-5(6) (1992); Pendleton. 918 P.2d at 160 (Semantic 
distinction between "residing" in the 1992 statute and "cohabiting" in the 1995 statute is 
"inconsequential"). 
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Finding number two accurately defines the term, "cohabitation" (two-pronged test 
of "common residency" and "sexual contact"). See, Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 
670 (Utah 1985); See, Kmiteson v. Knuteson. 518 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1980). 
Finding num > 
cohabitation) and its accompanying burden of proof ("preponderance of evidence"). 
Finding number four correctly defines "common residence". See Haddow. 707 
i • ii an»i z\ Sigg v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, • Jtah App. 1995). 
Finding number five is correct undisputed that Camille's primary residence— 
the Watson's marital home-is located at 1668 North 3990 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
Camille did deny that Talbot has ever lived with her at that address (2/1/96 Tr. at 195); 
and Talbot stated his primary residenc n Il nton! \\\ \ ? \ I Si inil Hi 
4000 West, West Valley City, Utah (2/1/96 Tr. at 122, 126). 
Finding number six relates to forwarding addresses for mail delivery used by 
Septembt ias received mail 
at Camille's address (2/1/96 Tr. at 27, 60-61, 96-97,124-25). During this period, Talbot 
also received mail at his mother's West Valley City home (Id. at 153-59). Talbot did use 
Camille's address as a forwarding address for an out-of-town bank statement and for the 
delivery of a W-2 form from a previous employer (Id. at 124-25), The trial court's 
finding that Talbot left Camille's address as a forwarding address with his apartment 
manager in Wendover, is a reasonable inference of the evidence: Goode, the investigator, 
testified that he personally * 
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Wendover he was 'toade aware" that Talbot had left Camille's address as a forwarding 
address (Id. at 36). 
Finding number seven is also correct: Camille and Talbot spent a substantial 
amount of time together at the Pleasant Grove address (2/1/96 Tr. at 125, 127, 160). See 
also, summary of Robert Goode, Craig Hilton, Rowella Talbot, and Shauna Farnsworth's 
testimony in Appellee's statement of relevant facts (supra, pp. 3-12). Furthermore, there 
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's inference that neighbors, friends, and a 
private investigator, "have seen both Mr. Talbot and Camille Watson appear to share a 
common abode in the [Watson marital] home the past two years, specifically during the 
period of December 1994 to November 1995" (R. 234-35; Tab 1 at 13-14). 
For example, Robert Goode, the investigator, testified that he saw Talbot every 
night he personally conducted surveillance at Camille's home (2/1/96 Tr. at 18). In 
addition, Talbot was observed by Goode, who surveilled Camille's home for ten months, 
and by a neighbor, Craig Hilton, who lived directly across the street from Camille, to: 
park his cars in the garage (Id. at 20, 75-76); and work in the yard and mow the lawn (Id. 
at 81-87). In addition, Hilton testified that he observed Talbot: take out the trash, argue 
with Camille, vacation with Camille, and leave the residence in the morning between 7-8 
a.m. (Id. at 83-87); and Goode, the investigator, testified that he saw Talbot: frequently 
use Camille's car, be present at the home when Camille and/or her children were absent, 
enter the home without knocking, utilize a garage door opener, and bring his children 
over to the home every other weekend (Id. at 23, 26, 32, 37, 41-42, 57). 
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Finding number eight-that Talbot always parked his car(s) in the same place in 
Camille's garage and appeared to have access to a garage door opener —is amply 
supported by the record through the testimony of Goode, Hilton, Talbot and Camille. 
being "like another one of his children9 and that "it doesn't stay out on the street' is 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that Talbot's car(s) were always in 
the garage {1 ""! % 11 al I" II " I) 
Finding number nine—that Camille and Talbot have spent the night together at the 
Watson home—is also well-supported by the testimony of Goode, Hilton, Talbot and 
Camille (2/1/96 Tr. at 41, 55-59, 86-87, 129, 134, 160, albot testified 
111 in 1 ill in >'il VH'IMII • ill 11 mi in in it t h e W a t s o n h o m e o n F r i d a v * / 
night or Monday morning (Id. at 160). 
Finding number ten that Talbot cleaned the garage, washed the cars, took out the 
eater for use at the home is supported by the testimony of Goode, Hilton, Talbot and 
Camille. (2/1/96 Tr. at 127, 129, 133). 
Finding number eleven 'that Talbot played itl i Camille . Idren and exercised 
visitation with his own children at her home is supported by the testimony of Goode, 
Talbot and Camille (2/1/96 Tr. at 41-42, 57, 131, 134, 183-84). 
Finding number twelve that Talbot bought groceries for the home and cooked 
meals for the family is supported H\ <nff 
in 
groceries for Camille and cooking meals for the children, and Camille testified he helped 
buy groceries for her when they were together (2/1/96 Tr. at 131, 132, 178-79, 183). 
Finding number thirteen states that the trial court found the testimony of Goode 
and Hilton 'to carry" greater weight than the testimony of Camille, Talbot, Mrs. Talbot 
and other defense witnesses (R. 234, "Findings" at 14). This finding, pertaining to 
witness credibility, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, Rule 52(a), 
U.R.C.P.; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Findings numbered fourteen through sixteen are also demonstrative of the 
testimony at trial. Finding number fourteen, and the inference derived therefrom, that if 
Talbot really lived with his mother in West Valley City, then he would have no need to 
have mail forwarded to Camille9s address, is supported in the record. Talbot testified he 
was living with his mother since September of 1994 (2/1/96 Tr. at 126). Finding number 
fifteen is also correct. It acknowledges that Talbot received mail at both Camille's home 
and his mother's home (2/1/96 Tr. at 124-25, 153-59). Finding number sixteen that 
Camille and Talbot had no joint accounts or operating expenses except for groceries and 
that Talbot operated on a "cash only" basis is also supported by the record (2/1/96 Tr. at 
123-24, 130, 131, 144, 160-61, 178-79). In addition, the trial court's inference, that "any 
physical evidence regarding shared expenses" would be difficult or impossible to produce 
because of Talbot's cash-based financial method, is reasonable. 
Finding number seventeen is a correct statement of the law with respect to the 
determinative value of shared financial obligations as a factor in establishing 
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cohabitation. Haddow. 707 P.2d at 673 (Shared financial obligations is not requisite 
element of cohabitation, but may be a significant factor for trial court's to address). 
The evidence produced in support of the facts listed in finding number eighteen 
in I'll I »| in i mi I i. H I I I I MI iMl l l ' i l I H I I ' I ( In ill I'M l adS iiilnl 11III ll I • iiil'"> 
conclusion that "Talbot and [Camille] were sharing a common residence for more than a 
brief period of time. (Statement of Relevant Facts, supra, pp. 3-13). 
Finding number nineteen (I till» I .ill1 I  'I" l is an issue of factual application tc la \ \ and 
will be addressed, infra, at Point II of Appellee's argument. However, finding number 
twenty, which shifts the burden of proof of sexual contact to the defendant once plaintiff 
has established "common residency" is correct under the statute in effect at the time of 
the parties9 divorce in 199.2 See < Pendleton » I >endleton. 918 P 2 1 155 • I< 50 (I f I < I: 
App. 1996). 
Nevertheless, substantial evidence of sexual contact between Camille and Talbot is 
sufficiently, and mi umbered twenty 
through twenty-six. (See, supra, Statement of Relevant Facts, pp. 3-13). Besides, 
appellant does not argue that the trial court's finding of sexual contact was "clearly 
erroneous".3 Therefore, this Court should assume that the trial court's findings of facts 
are correct Robb. 863 P.2d at 1328; Crockett 836 P2d at 820. 
Finding number twenty-seven-the establishment of cohabitation between Camille 
and Talbot by a preponderance of evidence—requires an application of fact to law that 
will be addressed, infra, at Point II of Appellee's argument. 
Finally, finding number twenty-eight is a correct statement of the provisions of the 
parties' divorce decree which requires a division of the equity in, and the sale of, the 
marital home upon cohabitation of Camille with another person (R. 25, 30). , 
Because the trial court's findings of fact have not been challenged or demonstrated 
to be "clearly erroneous", this Court should use these findings as the "given 
circumstances" to be applied to the legal elements of "cohabitation". 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE GIVEN 
FACTS TO THE LEGAL STANDARD OF "COHABITATION" 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(6) provides that the right to alimony shall 
terminate upon cohabitation of the receiver with another person. In addition, the Decree 
3Appellant only argues that the trial court relied upon "circumstantial" evidence (Br. of Appellee 
at 21). Appellant complains that the trial court relied too heavily upon the empty box of condoms 
found in the trash can because it is equally possible that the devices could have belonged to someone 
besides Talbot (Br. of Appellant at 21). However, the trial court found only that evidence of 
packaging from male contraceptive devices had been found in the discarded trash at Camille's 
residence and that any inferences therefrom were not adequately rebutted. (R. 230). 
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of Divorce executed by the parties here in 1992 provides that the marital home shall be 
sold and its equity divided between the parties if Camille Watson cohabitates with 
another individual in the home (R. 30). The standard of "cohabitation" is the same for 
alimony and equitable distribution of the marital home. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 674 
(Utah 1985). The trial court found that John Watson had established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Camille Watson was cohabitating with Jerry Talbot. 
Therefore, the trial court ordered that alimony be terminated retroactive to January 1, 
1995, and that the marital home be sold according to the procedures set forth in the 
Decree of Divorce. Appellant argues that this order constitutes an "abuse of discretion." 
This Court is not bound by the ultimate conclusion of the trial court with respect to 
"whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation." Haddow. 707 P.2d at 671; 
Pendleton v. Pendleton. 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). However, this Court will 
not disturb the facts found by the trial court unless they are "clearly erroneous". Sigg. 
905 P.2d at 918; Pendleton. 918 P.2d at 160. As set forth in Point I, the factual findings 
in this case are legally sufficient. Therefore, they constitute the "given circumstances" to 
be applied by this Court to the legal standard of cohabitation. 
In Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the test for "cohabitation." The Court concluded that there are "two key 
elements to be considered" in making a determination of cohabitaion: "common 
residency" and "sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Haddow. 707 P.2d at 
672. 
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A. The Given Facts in this Case Establish "Common Residency" 
Courts in Utah have defined "common residency" as "the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or 
brief period of time." Haddow. 707 P.2d at 672. See also, Pendleton. 918 P.2d at 160; 
Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917. In Haddow. several factors were used by the court in determining 
whether the given circumstance arose to the level of "common residency": One, the 
amount of time spent by the third person at the marital home. Two, whether the time 
spent together between the third person and the spouse receiving alimony and in 
possession of the home ("receiving spouse") evidenced "continuity" and was for more 
than a brief period of time. Three, whether the third person kept or moved into the home 
personal objects such as furniture and clothing. Four, whether the third person and the 
receiving spouse had joint financial obligations or property, or other shared living 
expenses. Five, whether the third party had access to the home (such as a key) or had 
spent time alone in the home when the receiving spouse was not present. Haddow. 707 
P.2dat673. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding 
of "cohabitation" on grounds that, although the third person spent a "substantial" period 
of time at the party's home, the given facts and circumstances did not establish "common 
residency." 707 P.2d at 674. The court based its decision on the following factors: one, 
that the third person had no key to the home nor had he spent any time alone in the home; 
two, no furniture or personal items beyond some clothing and toiletry articles belonging 
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to the third person were kept in the home; three, the car belonging to the third person 
parked at the home was not relevant of the third person's presence because he used 
another car for his daily activities; and four, that the receiving spouse and third person did 
not share living expenses. 
This Court recently addressed the issue of "cohabitation" in Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 159). In its analysis, this Court examined Haddow 
and found that the Utah Supreme Court had focused primarily on "whether [the third 
person] traveled freely in and out of [the receiving spouse's] home"; and that the two 
determinative facts used by the Supreme Court in finding no "common residency" were 
that the third person "had no key to the house and that he did not spend time there when 
Mrs. Haddow was away." Pendleton. 918 P.2d at 160. Applying Haddow to the facts 
in Pendleton, this Court found that the element of "common residency" had been 
established: The third person's job in real estate required frequent out-of-town travel; the 
third person spent ninety percent of his "in town" time—four to five nights a week—at the 
home; he had his own key; and he had free access to the home and spent time there 
alone. Pendleton. 918 P.2d at 161. 
In this case, like Pendleton. Talbot had access to Camille's home and he spent 
time there alone. The testimony of the investigator, Robert Goode, established that 
Talbot had a garage door opener and that he always parked his cars in the same place in 
the garage (2/1/96 Tr. at 20); and that he was frequently at the home when neither 
Camille nor the Watson children were present (Id. at 31-32). Goode had conducted 
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surveillance at the house and in person and by video camera for ten months (2/1/96 Tr. at 
15, 18). 
Goode testified further that Talbot was present at the Watson home each night 
Goode personally surveilled the residence (2/1/96 Tr. at 18); and that Talbot was never 
present at his mother's home in West Valley City during a three to four month period in 
early 1995, when Goode conducted surveillance on the house a couple of times per week 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 62-63). Goode had also observed Talbot changing clothes in the master 
bedroom (2/1/96 Tr. at 19); and he testified that Talbot had access to the Watson home on 
a regular basis, and that he frequently was engaged in activities around the house. 
Camille's neighbor, Craig Hilton, also testified to Talbot's intimate involvement in 
activities at the house which included doing yard work, mowing the lawn, washing the 
cars, carrying groceries and taking out the trash (2/1/96 Tr. at 78-87). 
Moreover, Talbot, himself, admitted to: typically spending three to four days of 
the week at the Pleasant Grove house (2/1/96 Tr. at 160); having possession of a garage 
door opener, fixing the garage door opener, always parking his car in the garage (2/1/96 
Tr. at 128-29, 142); and, frequently spending time in Camille's home with her children 
when she wasn't there. (2/1/96 Tr. at 129-130). Furthermore, Camille admitted that "it 
could be the case" that she and her children have been away from the house while Talbot 
was left in the home doing yard work, washing his car, and going in and out the front 
door (2/1/96 Tr. at 185, 187-88). 
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In addition, Talbot testified that he and Camille had been dating "a little over two 
years", that he had driven Camille's car, purchased groceries and cooked for her and the 
Watson children, worked in the yard, collected the mail, taken out the trash, done the 
laundry and the dishes, driven the Watson children to school, baby-sat the children, 
taken the children and Camille camping and fishing (2/1/96 Tr. at 127, 129, 131, 137, 
138-40, 142, 143). Talbot testified that his television set was in the master bedroom and 
his stereo in one of the children's room, that he had purchased a weed-eater for the yard, 
and that he had bought several items for Camille's children for Christmas, birthdays, or if 
they "need[ed] something and Camille [didn't] have the money" (2/1/96 Tr. at 133, 141). 
Talbot further agreed that his children have "stayed-over" at Camille's once or twice a 
month (2/1/96 Tr. at 131); and that he, Camille and their respective children had spent 
Christmas in 1994 together at the Watson home (2/1/96 Tr. at 134). 
The given circumstances of this case clearly establish that Talbot and Camille 
shared a "common residency" in the Watson's marital home for a period often months to 
two years prior to the trial court proceeding. Talbot had access to the house, spent three 
to four days a week at the house, brought his children frequently to the house, and 
regularly engaged in domestic activities and tasks that only a resident would perform. 
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that appellee had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Talbot and 
Camille Watson shared a common residence. 
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B. The Given Facts of this Case Support the Trial Court's Finding of 
"Sexual Contact" 
The second required element for "cohabitation" is "sexual contact evidencing a 
conjugal association". Haddow. 707 P.2d at 672. This prong of the "cohabitation" test 
has not been as clearly defined by courts. 
However, appellant has not adequately argued that the trial court's findings and 
conclusion of "sexual contact" between Camille and Talbot. Appellant's entire argument 
on sexual contact consisted of one paragraph which contains no citation to the record nor 
any supporting legal argument. Appellant only argues that the evidence surrounding the 
empty box of condoms found in the trash at the home "was very circumstantial." (Br. of 
Appellant at 21). 
Nonetheless, when viewing this case as a whole, there was plenty of evidence 
before the trial court, and before this Court, to establish a conjugal relationship between 
Camille and Talbot. Both Talbot and appellant admitted to having a "close" relationship 
for over two years (2/1/96 Tr. at 125, 127, 184-84). Family, friends, and neighbors knew 
of this on-going, close relationship which clearly evidenced more than friendship: 
Craig Hilton testified, a neighbor, testified that: he observed Talbot and Camille 
argue, heard Camille beg Talbot not to leave because she loved him, and saw Talbot's car 
leave the house between seven and eight a.m. which led him to believe that Talbot had 
spent the night (2/1/96 Tr. at 84). 
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Talbot testified that he would not take a bath or shower, or use the bathroom when 
Camille was using it (2/1/96 Tr. at 135-36), however, Robert Goode testified that Talbot 
was present at the house each night he personally conducted surveillance, that he 
observed Talbot changing clothes in the master bedroom, and that he had observed Talbot 
and Camille in the master bedroom-late at night with Camille in a white robe-before he 
observed the two of them enter the master bathroom and then close the window shades 
(2/1/96 Tr. at 15, 18, 19,41). Talbot admitted to taking the trash out of Camille's house. 
(Id. at 143). Goode also testified to finding an empty box of condoms in the garbage (Id. 
at 33). 
Talbot, himself, admitted to spending approximately three nights per week at 
Camille's house and to sleeping on occasion in the master bedroom (2/1/96 Tr. at 134, 
160). Shauna Farnsworth, a close friend of Camille's, knew about the relationship 
between Camille and Talbot and she knew when the couple was arguing (Id. at 101, 102). 
Farnsworth also testified that Camille and Talbot had vacationed together (Id. at 102-03). 
The given facts taken as a whole clearly support the trial court's finding of "sexual 
contact": Talbot and Camille had a close relationship for over two years; they vacationed 
together, they spent the night together at the Watson home on a weekly basis, and they 
were observed together late at night in the master bedroom and bathroom. See Haddow, 
707 P.2d at 672 (Court affirmed finding of sexual contact based on facts that couple 
regularly spent the night together, dated for over fourteen months, and vacationed 
together). None of this evidence was rebutted, nor did appellant establish that her 
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relationship with Talbot was '^ without any sexual contact" as required by Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-5 (1992). Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence sufficiently establishes "sexual 
contact" between appellant and Talbot. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellee, John Watson, asks that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial court's 
order terminating alimony and requiring the sale of the marital home which was correctly 
based upon the established cohabitation of Camille Watson and another. John Watson 
asks that he be awarded costs according to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
that this Court order that appellant compensate him for any alimony paid after January of 
1995, as ordered by the trial court. Finally, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, John Watson asks that this court award him reasonable attorney's 
fees expended on appeal. 
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1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. WATSON, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
Plaintiff, EVIDENTIARY HEARING RE: 
DEFENDANTS COHABITATION 
VS. 
Case No. 924402232 
CAMILLE K. WATSON# Judge Howard H. Maetani 
District Court Judge 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff's Order 
to Show Cause filed on or about November 27, 1995, alleging that 
Defendant was cohabitating. The Court determined that an 
evidentiary hearing should be held on this issue. On February 1, 
1996, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of 
cohabitation before Judge Howard Maetani. Both parties were 
present at the hearing. Chris Greenwood represented Plaintiff, 
John D. Watson, James Haskins represented Defendant, Camille K. 
Watson. Testimony was heard, evidence was presented by the 
parties, and argument was made by counsel. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and the 
evidence presented and upon being advised in the premises, now 
makes the following memorandum decision and findings of fact: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Procedural History 
On or about November 12, 1992 a Decree of Divorce was 
entered for these parties on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. The Decree provided that Plaintiff pay alimony to 
Defendant in the amount of $250.00 per month until such time as 
the Plaintiff remarried or cohabitated. See Decree of Divorce f 
(15). Additionally, Defendant was awarded the marital residence 
until the first of three express triggering events occurred, 
specifically, "(a) Defendant remarries or cohabitates with any 
other person • . .•• See Decree of Divorce 55 5# 5(a) • Further, 
Defendant was given the right to purchase Plaintiffs equity 
interest in the home for $18,000.00 at any time prior to the 
occurrence of the first of any of three triggering events found 
in Paragraph 5. See Decree of Divorce 5 (5). 
The Decree of Divorce also states that if the Defendant did 
not exercise her option to purchase prior to the occurrence of 
any of three triggering events, then the residence would be sold 
at fair market value and the monies divided pursuant to 
provisions found in the Decree of Divorce. See Decree of Divorce 
5 (5). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause on or about 
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November 27, 1995, alleging that Defendant had been cohabitating 
with Mr. Jerry Talbot. Plaintiff requested an Order terminating 
alimony payments and enforcing the provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce regarding disposition of the marital home. The hearing 
on that motion was scheduled before Judge Howard H. Maetani on 
December 12, 1995. That hearing was stricken. Subsequently, 
this matter was set for an evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Anthony Schofield on January 11, 1996 on the cohabitation issue. 
On or about January 11, 1996, Judge Schofield moved to recuse 
himself. The matter was referred to Judge Lynn W. Davis for 
reassignment. The matter was reassigned to Judge Howard H. 
Maetani for evidentiary hearing on February 1, 1996. 
The evidentiary hearing of February 1, 1996 was held on the 
issue of cohabitation before Judge Howard H. Maetani. Testimony 
was taken at the hearing, evidence was presented, and the 
argument of counsel was heard. 
At close of evidence, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. Additionally, the Court requested counsel to submit 
proposed Findings of Fact within 15 days and gave counsel 10 days 
to submit any responses. Counsel to request a Ruling at the end 
of the time period allotted. 
Subsequently, on or about February 2, 1996, Plaintiff filed 
Motion to Reopen Evidence and Memorandum in Support thereof. 
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On or about February 20, 1996, Defendant filed Response to 
Motion to Reopen Evidence. On or about February 27, 1996, 
Defendant filed Closing Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
On or about March 8, 1996, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On or about 
March 25, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Evidence Presented At Trial 
Counsel waived Opening Statements. Several witnesses 
testified regarding the issue of Defendant's alleged cohabitation 
with Mr* Jerry Talbot. 
Plaintiff called Robert N. Goode to testify. Mr. Goode 
testified that he is a licensed private investigator with over 14 
years of experience and had been hired to do surveillance on 
Camille Watson's residence, located at 1668 North 390 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. Mr. Goode testified that he began 
surveillance on the home in December of 1994, and that 
surveillance continued in the following fashion: From December 
17, 1994 through February 1995 Mr. Goode personally conducted 
surveillance on the residence; from February 1995 through April 
1995 a stationary video surveillance system was utilized; from 
April 1995 to October 1995 Mr. Goode did random checks of the 
residence; October 1995, use of the stationary video system was 
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resumed; surveillance was discontinued in November 1995. 
Mr. Goode also testified that he had performed a "skip 
trace" on Mr. Jerry Talbot and that trace indicated Mr. Talbot's 
principle domicile and residence was the home at 1668 North 390 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah during the period of December 1994 to 
November 1995. Mr. Goode testified that he personally witnessed 
Mr. Talbot spending the night with Defendant in Pleasant Grove 
and not at any other address, including that of Mr. Talbot's 
mother in West Valley City. During the period January to March, 
1995, Mr. Goode travelled to Mr. Talbot's mother's home in West 
Valley City once or twice a week. On each occasion, Mr. Goode 
never observed Mr. Talbot, nor Mr. Talbot's car present at the 
home. 
Mr. Goode also testified to the following matters: 
1). That Mr. Jerry Talbot was present at the residence 
located at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, each night 
that he personally surveilled the residence. 
2). That Mr. Talbot's car was parked in the garage in the 
same place each time he checked the residence. 
3). That Mr. Goode observed Mr. Talbot entering and leaving 
the residence having changed clothes. 
4). That Mr. Goode observed Mr. Talbot changing clothes in 
the master bedroom on one occasion. 
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5). That Mr- Goode observed Mr- Talbot present in the 
master bedroom with Defendant and observed him follow her into 
the master bathroom. 
6) . Mr. Goode also observed Mr. Talbot use a garage door 
opener to obtain access to the residence; work on his car in the 
garage at the residence; use Defendant's car frequently; arrive 
and leave from the residence when Defendant was not present; 
clean the garage; do yard work at the home; enter the home 
without knocking; return late at night when all the lights in the 
home were off; carry groceries into the home; carry a duffel bag 
and weight belt into the home and return to the car without the 
duffel bag. Mr. Goode also observed children other than the 
Watson children at the home every other weekend on a regular 
basis. 
7). Mr. Goode testified regarding other actions he took in 
the investigation. Mr. Goode went to Mr. Talbot's former 
residence in Wendover and spoke to the apartment manager who 
informed him that Mr. Talbot had left the address at 1668 North 
390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah as his forwarding address. Mr. 
Talbot found several pieces of mail in the trash showing that Mr. 
Talbot was using the Pleasant Grove address as his mailing 
residence. See Plaintiff's Exhibits #3 and 4. Mr. Goode also 
recovered packaging for male prophylactic devises when searching 
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the trash. See Plaintiff's Exhibit #2. Mr. Goode contacted Mr. 
Talbot's former employer, and was informed that Mr. Talbot was 
using the Pleasant Grove address on his W-2 form as a forwarding 
address. See Plaintiff's Exhibit #4. 
8). Mr. Goode testified that in his opinion, Mr. Talbot was 
living in the Defendant/s home in Pleasant Grove from 
approximately December 1994 until November of 1995. 
9). Plaintiff then called Craig Hilton to testify. Mr. 
Hilton testified that he lives in a home across the street from 
Camille Watson and has full view of the Watson residence. Mr. 
Hilton testified that he had met Mr. Talbot about two years ago 
at Camille Watson's home. Mr. Hilton testified that 
approximately one year ago, he was present when Jerry Talbot 
attended a church related "Daddy - Daughter" party with Camille 
Watson's daughter. Mr. Hilton testified that he saw the Watson 
residence every day, and that he has observed Mr. Talbot leaving 
from the residence several times between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., 
apparently leaving for work. Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. 
Talbot was not there every day. Mr. Talbot was there for several 
days at a time when he was present, and appeared to be living 
there. Mr. Hilton observed that Mr. Talbot parked his red 
Chevrolet Corvette and white Pontiac Grand Am in the garage at 
Defendant's home. Mr. Hilton has observed Mr. Talbot drive 
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Defendant/s car on several occasions. Mr. Hilton has witnessed 
Mr. Talbot work on the house and yard, go to the mailbox, wash 
the cars, often when the Defendant was not present. Mr. Hilton 
has witnessed Mr. Talbot with Defendant riding bicycles together 
and arguing in the garage. Mr. Hilton also testified that he 
observed Mr. Talbot playing with the Watson children in the yard. 
Mr. Hilton expressed his opinion that Jerry Talbot was living at 
Defendant's home during the period of December 1994 to November 
1995. 
Plaintiff called Mr. Russell Warr as the next witness. Mr. 
Warr did not appear in person to testify, rather, his testimony 
was offered by Affidavit. See Plaintiff's Exhibit §6. Mr. Warr 
is a United States Postal employee, whose route includes 
delivering mail to the residence at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah. Mr. Warr indicated in his Affidavit that since 
early 1995, (about January or February) he delivered mail to Mr. 
Talbot at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah on an 
occasional basis. 
Mr. Jerry Talbot, Defendant's boyfriend, was called to 
testify. He testified that he has been dating Defendant for 
about two years. In 1994, he did live in Wendover, Utah and 
worked at Ferrenco. He testified that he did not have mail sent 
to 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 84062. He 
8 
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the trash. See Plaintiff's Exhibit #2. Mr. Goode contacted Mr. 
Talbot's former employer, and was informed that Mr. Talbot was 
using the Pleasant Grove address on his W-2 form as a forwarding 
address. See Plaintiff's Exhibit §4. 
8). Mr. Goode testified that in his opinion, Mr. Talbot was 
living in the Defendant's home in Pleasant Grove from 
approximately December 1994 until November of 1995. 
9). Plaintiff then called Craig Hilton to testify. Mr. 
Hilton testified that he lives in a home across the street from 
Camille Watson and has full view of the Watson residence. Mr. 
Hilton testified that he had met Mr. Talbot about two years ago 
at Camille Watson's home. Mr. Hilton testified that 
approximately one year ago, he was present when Jerry Talbot 
attended a church related "Daddy - Daughter11 party with Camille 
Watson's daughter. Mr. Hilton testified that he saw the Watson 
residence every day, and that he has observed Mr. Talbot leaving 
from the residence several times between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., 
apparently leaving for work. Mr. Hilton testified that Mr. 
Talbot was not there every day. Mr. Talbot was there for several 
days at a time when he was present, and appeared to be living 
there. Mr. Hilton observed that Mr. Talbot parked his red 
Chevrolet Corvette and white Pontiac Grand Am in the garage at 
Defendant's home. Mr. Hilton has observed Mr. Talbot drive 
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beginning in November 1995. He testified that his home 
furnishings are in storage except for his weed-eater, television 
and radio which are at the Pleasant Grove address. He either 
purchased or gave these items as gifts to Defendant's children. 
Mr. Talbot testified that he does not share any joint bank 
accounts with Defendant. He testified that he does not deposit 
his paychecks in a bank account, but rather, cashes them and 
pockets the cash. Further, Mr. Talbot testified that he 
transacts with cash. Mr. talbot testified that he does not share 
living expenses with Defendant, but he has purchased gifts and 
paid for groceries on occasion. 
Mrs. Shauna Farnsworth, a close personal friend of 
Defendant, testified that she visits Defendant 3 or 4 times per 
week to go jogging. Mr. Farnsworth testified that Mr. Talbot was 
present at the home when she and Defendant go out jogging. Mrs. 
Farnsworth also testified that she has been in Defendant's 
bedroom on occasion, and did not observe anything in the room 
that could be identified as belonging to Mr. Talbot. 
Defendant, Camille Watson, testified that the residence 
located at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, is the 
principle place of residence for herself and the parties' minor 
children. She testified that she has an affectionate 
relationship with Mr. Talbot and has been dating him for about 
10 
two years. She testified that Mr. Talbot has been in her home at 
times when she was not present. During the period of December 
1994 to February 1995 she testified that Mr. Talbot's children 
were in her home every other weekend on a monthly basis. 
Defendant testified that Mr. Talbot spent Christmas of 1994 with 
her and her children. She testified that Mr. Talbot has entered 
her home late at night through the garage door and has spent the 
night. Ms. Watson testified that Mr. Talbot stayed in a spare 
bedroom when he did spend the night. She testified that Mr. 
Talbot cashes his paychecks and uses his money to buy groceries 
on occasion for her and her children. 
Rowella Talbot, Mr. Talbot's mother, testified that Mr. 
Talbot currently lives with her in West Valley City, Utah and has 
been continuously living with her since November 1994. She 
testified that Mr. Talbot's furniture is in storage in Delta, 
Utah. She testified that during the time period of December 1994 
through March 1995, that there were no nights during the week 
when he was not sleeping at home. Mrs. Talbot testified that her 
son Jerry Talbot, had spent the 1994 Christmas holiday with her. 
She also testified that Mr. Talbot had taken some of his personal 
belongings, such as a radio and television set to Defendant's 
home for Defendant's children to use. 
Defendant's counsel presented as exhibits, approximately 2 0 
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pieces of mail, that had been addressed to Mr. Jerry Talbot at 
his mother's address in West Valley City, Utah. 
B. ANALYSIS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Pursuant to Utah statute, "Any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse 
is cohabitating with another person." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(9) (Supp. 1995). The language of the statute places the burden 
upon the obligor to establish cohabitation on the part of the 
obligee. In the case at bar, it is Plaintiff's burden to 
establish that Defendant has cohabitated. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has defined cohabitation in 
relation to a two-prong test: " . . . [T]here are two key elements 
that need to be considered in determining whether or not an 
individual has cohabitated with a person of the opposite sex: (1) 
residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association." See Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 
1985). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has said that residency 
contemplates more than a temporary stay. See Knuteson v. 
Knuteson, 518 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1980). 
3. At issue in this case is whether or not Plaintiff has 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had 
12 
a common residence with Mr. Jerry Talbot for more than a brief 
period of time, and whether there is sexual contact between them 
evidencing a conjugal association. 
4. (1) Common Residency: Common residency means "the 
sharing of a common abode that both paries consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of 
time." See Sigg v. Sigg, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, 54 (November 7, 
1995); Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980). 
5. In this case, Defendant admits that the home located at 
1668 North 3990 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah is her primary 
residence and also that of her minor children* Defendant denies 
that Mr. Talbot lives or has ever lived at that address. Mr. 
Talbot denies that he has ever lived at that address. 
6. Mr. Talbot has given the address of 1668 North 390 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah as a forwardina address to his 
employer and rior landlord and an out-of-state bank. Mr. Talbot 
has received mail at 1668 North 390 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
Mr. Talbot has also received mail at his mother's address in 
West Valley City. 
7. Iir. Talbot and Defendant spent a substantial amount of 
time together at the Pleasant Grove address. close neigh*, irs, 
personal friends, and a private investigator have seen both Mr. 
Talbot and Camille Watson appear to share a common abode in the 
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home over the past two years, specifically during the period of 
December 1994 to November 1995. 
8. Mr. Talbot parked his car in the same place in 
Defendant's garage on a regular basis and appeared to have access 
to the home via a garaged door opener. 
9. AT. Talbot and Defendant have spent the night together 
at the Pleasant Grove residence. 
10. Mr. Talbot cleaned the garage, washed the cars, took 
out the trash, and picked up the mail. Mr. Talbot mowed the lawn 
during the summer months and purchased a weed-eater for use at 
the home. 
11. Mr. Talbot played with Defendant's children and 
exercised visitation with his own children from a previous 
relationship at the Pleasant Grove residence. 
12. Mr. Talbot bought groceries for the home and cooked 
meals for the family. 
13. The Court has considered the testimony of the witnesses 
regarding the issue of Mr. Talbot's residency at 1168 North 390 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. The Court finds that the testimony 
of the uninterested parties, Mr. Goode and Mr. Hilton to carry 
the greater weight in this instance. Camille Watson, Mr. Talbot, 
Mrs. Rowella Talbot, and Defendant's friends who testified were 
interested parties whose bias was apparent. 
14 
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14. Additionally, there were discrepancies in their 
testimony which were never adequately resolved. For example, Mr. 
Talbot and his mother testified that Mr. Talbot lived with his 
mother in West Valley City, and has done so since he left 
Wendover in December 1994. Mr. Talbot also testified that he had 
used the Pleasant Grove address for forwarding purposes, 
believing that Defendant would forward his mail onward in a 
responsible manner. If Mr. Talbot has lived with his mother 
since his return from Wendover, he would have no need for a 
forwarding address in Pleasant Grove, and no need to involve 
Defendant in forwarding his mail. Additionally, the bank 
statement from the State Bank of Prairie de Rocher was dated July 
27, 1995. See Plaintiff's Exhibit §3. This was far after the 
time that Mr. Talbot moved from Wendover, when a forwarding 
address might have been needed, and in the middle of the time 
period that he testified to living with his mother. 
15. The Court realizes that there is no question that Mr. 
Jerry Talbot was receiving mail both at his mother's home in West 
Valley City, and at Defendant's residence in Pleasant Grove. Mr. 
Talbot testified that he had several different mailing addresses 
over the past few years. It is entirely possible that his mother 




16. The Court notes the evidence that Mr. Talbot and the 
Defendant did not share any joint bank accounts. Defendant and 
Mr. Talbot also testified that they did not share any joint 
expenses for operating the home, except for grocery purchases. 
However, evidence was presented that Mr. Talbot did not have any 
in-state bank accounts open during the time period in question, 
that he cashed any payroll checks and dealt with his finances on 
a cash only basis. Thus, any physical evidence regarding shared 
expenses would be difficult, if not impossible to prove. 
17. In Utah, although the sharing of financial obligations 
surround the maintenance of a household may be significant, it is 
not a requisite element of cohabitation. See Haddow v. Haddow, 
707 P.2d 669, 673 (Utah 1985). 
18. The Court has considered the evidence which indicates 
that Mr. Talbot had unrestricted access to the home, even when 
Defendant was not present; assumed duties and responsibilities 
consistent with a resident; exercised visitation with his 
children there; bought groceries and fixed meals at the home; 
used the home for his own convenience; brought some items of 
personal property into the home; and used the Pleasant Grove 
address as a mailing address. The Court gives this evidence the 
greater weight in establishing that Mr. Talbot and Defendant were 
sharing a common residence for more than a brief period of time. 
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19. Based upon the weight of the evidence presented, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Jerry Talbot and Defendant were sharing a 
common abode for more than a temporary stay at the Pleasant Grove 
address for the past two years. Further, the Court finds that 
for approximately a ten month period, during the period of 
December 1994 to November 1995, Mr. Talbot resided with 
Defendant. Close neighbors, personal acquaintances, and 
professional investigators have seen and documented Mr. Talbot 
and Defendant residing together. 
20. Once residence with a person of the opposite sex is 
established, the burden shifts to the obligee to establish that 
the relationship is without any sexual contact. See Wacker v. 
Wacker, 668 P.2d 533, 534 (Utah 1983). 
21. (2) Sexual contact: Sexual Contact means sexual contact 
of a type that evidences a conjugal relationship. See Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1985). The Court recognizes that 
there will almost never be a situation where there is an 
eyewitness to such sexual conduct, therefore, the Court must look 
to the overall picture. 
22. Both Defendant and Mr. Talbot admitted that they had a 
close, personal relationship with each other. Defendant 
characterized it as an "affectionate" relationship in her 
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testimony. Mr. Talbot characterized it as "dating" in his 
testimony. Both of them testified that the relationship had been 
ongoing for about two years. Both Defendant and Mr. Talbot have 
held themselves out to friends and neighbors as having a close 
personal relationship evidencing more than friendship. 
23. Mr. Goode testified that he had observed the Defendant 
and Mr. Talbot in the roaster bedroom, and the master bath at the 
same time. 
24. Mr. Talbot and Defendant testified that there were 
several times when Jerry Talbot spent the night in the home. 
Their testimony differed however, on where he slept on those 
occasions. Defendant stated that Mr. Talbot slept in a "spare" 
bedroom. Mr. Talbot stated that he slept on the couch. They 
both admitted that on at least one occasion Mr. Talbot slept on 
the bed in the master bedroom. Mr. Goode and Mr. Hilton/s 
testimony indicated that Mr. Talbot and Defendant had spent the 
night at Defendants residence on a routine and ongoing basis 
during the period of December 1994 and November 1995. 
25. Physical evidence of discarded packaging from male 
contraceptive devises were found in the trash discarded from 
Defendant's residence. That evidence was never adequately 
rebutted. 
26. The Court realizes that much of the evidence is 
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circumstantial regarding sexual contact between Defendant and Mr. 
Talbot, however, taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that 
there has been sexual contact. 
27. The Court finds that cohabitation between Defendant and 
Mr. Jerry Talbot has been established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (9) 
(1995 Supp.) the Court finds that Plaintiff's obligation to pay 
alimony is terminated, retroactive to January 1, 1995. 
28. Based upon Defendant's cohabitation, the Court finds 
that the provisions of the parties' Decree of Divorce regarding a 
division of the equity in the marital home should be invoked and 
the marital home sold. 
29. Finally, both parties have requested an award of 
attorney fees and costs in this matter, however, neither party 
has submitted an affidavit of attorney fees, nor was any evidence 
presented regarding need and ability to pay. The Court has no 
evidence upon which to make findings regarding the reasonableness 
of the fees, the hours expended, or the need of one party over 
the other in regards to the issue of attorney fees. Therefore, 
the Court finds that each party should be responsible to pay 
their own attorney fees and costs in this matter. 
19 
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C. DECISION 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has established by a 
preponderance of the evidence cohabitation on the part of the 
Defendant. 
2. The Court concludes that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5 (9) (1995 Supp.)/ Plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony to 
Defendant is terminated, retroactive to January 1, 1995. 
3. The Court concludes that the provisions of the parties/ 
Divorce Decree regarding disposition of the marital home ar 
invoked and the home is to be sold. 
4. The Court concludes that each party is responsible to 
pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
5. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Evidence is DENIED. 
DATED 'this A day of is^ ., 1996, 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved As to Form: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendant 
-f^y^c^*^* 
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have failed the plain mandate of justice if it 
had refused to allow the defense. 
We think that the same principle applies 
with greater force in this case, where sum-
mary judgment was granted prior to dis-
covery (within two months and one week of 
the filing of the complaint) and where re-
spondent did not argue that it had been 
surprised or disadvantaged, but argued 
only that the Rules of Civil Procedure pre-
cluded appellants' defense. 
This Court, in applying Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c) 
in Cheney, made the following observa-
tions, which were recently quoted in Wil-
liams v. State Farm Insurance Co., Utah, 
656 P.2d 966, 970 (1982), and Eie v. SL 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d at 1193-94: 
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 
8(c), U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative 
defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule 
whose purpose is to have the issues to be 
tried clearly framed. But it is not the 
only rule in the book of Rules of Civil 
Procedure. They must all be looked to in 
the light of their even more fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and 
procedure to the end that the parties are' 
afforded the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they 
have pertaining to their dispute. What 
they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, that is all 
that is required. Our rules provide for 
liberality to allow examination into and 
settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of 
the other party to have a reasonable time 
to meet a new issue if he so requests. 
Rule 16(b), U.R.C.P., so states. It fur-
ther allows for an amendment to con-
form to the proof after trial or even after 
judgment, and indicates that if the ends 
of justice so require, "failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." This idea is con-
firmed by Rule 64(cXD, U.R.C.P.: 
"[E]very final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." 
14 Utah 2d at 211, 881 P.2d at 91 (citation 
omitted). 
Also, in Williams v. State Farm Insur-
ance Co., 666 P.2d at 971, reviewing at 
length the standards that apply to a deter-
mination of the adequacy of pleadings rais-
ing the affirmative defense of fraud, partic-
ularly under Rules 8(c) and 9(b), this Court 
concluded: 
It is evident from these statements 
that the fundamental purpose of our lib-
eralized pleading rules is to afford par-
ties "the privilege of presenting whatev-
er legitimate contentions they have per-
taining to their dispute/' subject only to 
the requirement that their adversary 
have "fair notice of the nature and basis 
or grounds of the claim and a general 
indication of the type of litigation in-
volved." The functions of issue-formu-
lation and fact-revelation are appro-
priately left to the deposition-discovery 
process. The rules "allow examination 
into the settlement of all issues bearing 
upon the controversy," with latitude for 
proof that extends beyond the pleadings, 
where appropriate. Rule 16(b). It also 
appears from the cited decisions that 
these principles are applied with great 
liberality in sustaining the sufficiency 
of allegations stating a cause of action 
or an affirmative defense. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Ad-
dressing specifically Rule 9(b), the Court in 
Williams added: 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms of 
uncertain meaning. They are conclu-
sions that must be fleshed out by elabo-
ration and by consideration of the con-
text in which they are used. This is why 
Rule 9(b) requires that the circumstances 
constituting fraud "shall be stated with 
particularity," a requirement we have 
construed to require allegation of the 
substance of the acts constituting the 
alleged wrong. 
666 P.2d at 972 (emphasis added). 
[12] In light of the fundamental pur-
pose of our pleading rules to afford the 
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parties the privilege of presenting whatev-
er legitimate contentions they have pertain-
ing to the dispute, appellants are not as a 
matter of law foreclosed from asserting 
defenses based on "fraud" by their failure 
to use the term "fraud" or a derivative 
thereof or by their failure to allege each 
and every element of common-law fraud. 
The overriding inquiry urged in Cheney 
and Williams is whether appellants1 factu-
al allegations gave fair notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them 
and whether surprise or disadvantage 
would result If the defense or defenses 
were allowed. Both the timing of respon-
dent's motion for summary judgment and 
the specificity of appellants' averments pre-
clude imposing a Rule 12(h) waiver in this 
case. The substance of the acts constitut-
ing the alleged wrong was pleaded with 
particularity in appellants' averment that 
the bank's representatives "promised ap-
pellants that their signatures were for ap-
pearances only and that no collection ac-
tions, legal or otherwise, would be brought 
against Ronald or Margie Swenson based 
on said signatures." This specific allega-
tion, combined with appellants' general 
averment that neither party intended the 
signatures to have effect and that these 
representations induced their signatures, 
gave fair notice that appellants were deny-
ing personal liability on the note because of 
respondent's alleged misrepresentations. 
In Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Mei-
bos, discussed supra, this Court affirmed a 
jury verdict that similar facts constituted 
fraud in the inducement 
Utah 66! 
Ingrld Mae HADDOW, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
John David HADDOW, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 18368. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 30, 1986. 
Former husband sought order requi 
ing former wife to pay one half of equity • 
home in which she was living pursuant 
divorce decree which established equitab 
lien if former wife cohabitated with a me 
person. The Third District Court, Si 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft J., impos 
the lien, and former wife appealed. T 
Supreme Court Durham, J., held that 
though relatively permanent sexual re 
tionship existed between former wife a 
male companion, there was no common r< 
idency; thus, former wife was not requir 
under divorce decree to pay former hi 
band one half of equity in home in wh 
she was living. 
Reversed. 
Howe, J., concurred in result 
Hall, CJ., filed a dissenting opini 
Accordingly, summary judgment Is re-
versed, and this case Is remanded to the 
district court for further consideration con-
sistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
1. Divorce *»261, 286(8) 
Determination of whether given 
cumstances constitute "cohabitatic 
which requires enforcement of equite 
lien under terms of divorce decree, if 
reality a mixed question of fact and 1 
and the Supreme Court Is not bound 
conclusion reached by trial court 
2. Divorce •=•184(1) 
In reviewing trial court's actions 
divorce case, the Supreme Court is ve: 
with broad equitable powers. 
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3. Divorce *»247 
Under statute [U.C.A.1953, 30-3-6(3)] 
providing that court order to pay alimony 
to former spouse shall be terminated if it is 
established that former spouse is residing 
with person of opposite sex, "common resi-
dency" means sharing of common abode 
that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief 
period of time. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Divorce *»247 
Under statute [U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3)] 
providing that court order to pay alimony 
to former spouse shall be terminated if it is 
established that former spouse is residing 
with person of opposite sex, "sexual con-
tact" means participation in a relatively 
permanent sexual relationship akin to that 
generally existing between husband and 
wife. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Divorce *»252.5(1) 
Although relatively permanent sexual 
relationship existed between former wife 
and male companion, there was no common 
residency; thus, former wife was not re-
quired under divorce decree, which re-
quired former wife to pay one half of equi-
ty of house in which she was living if she 
cohabited with a male person, to pay for-
mer husband one half of equity in home 
where male companion did not move any 
furniture into home or keep any personal 
items there other than toiletry articles, and 
male companion did not pay any of former 
wife's living expenses or consistently share 
with her any assets. 
6. Divorce *=>252.5(1) 
In case involving enforcement of eq-
uitable lien on home used by custodial par-
ent, "cohabitation" means to dwell together 
in common residence and to participate in 
sexual contact that evidences a larger con-
jugal relationship. 
David 0. Drake, Costa Mesa, Cal., for 
plaintiff and appellant 
John D. Parken, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a decision in 
which the trial court found that appellant 
was cohabiting with a man and ordered her 
to pay to her former husband one-half of 
the equity in the home in which she was 
living, pursuant to an equitable lien estab-
lished in the divorce decree. Because we 
believe that the trial court improperly con-
strued the language of the decree, we re-
verse. 
The parties in this action, appellant In-
grid Haddow and respondent John Had-
dow, were divorced on September 11,1980. 
Mrs. Haddow waived her right to alimony. 
She was awarded custody of the parties' 
three children, who ranged in age from 
seven years to thirteen years. Mr. Had-
dow was ordered to pay child support m 
the amount of $450 per month, and Mrs. 
Haddow was awarded the parties' home, 
subject to an equitable lien in favor of Mr. 
Haddow of half the equity in the home. 
The equity was to be payable upon any of 
the following occurrences: all of the chil-
dren ceased to reside in the house or Mrs. 
Haddow moved out of the house, remar-
ried, or "cohabited with a male person." 
After the divorce, Mr. Haddow entered 
the house and took several items without 
Mrs. Haddow's permission. Thereafter, in 
February 1982, Mrs. Haddow obtained a 
temporary restraining order enjoining Mr. 
Haddow from coming to the house without 
her express permission. A short time la-
ter, Mr. Haddow filed a motion for an order 
requiring Mrs. Haddow to pay him one-half 
of the equity in the home because she was 
allegedly cohabiting with a man. 
At trial, the testimony centered on the 
nature and extent of appellant's relation-
ship with her boyfriend, Hy Hudson. 
There was no dispute that Mr. Hudson 
spent most of his free time with appellant 
The trial court found that Mr. Hudson had 
dinner at appellant's house five or six times 
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a week, that on those occasions he usually P.2d 585, 586 n. 
stayed until sometime between 10:30 p.m. 
and midnight, and that he would often re-
turn in the morning to have coffee or 
breakfast with appellant before work. The 
court also found that Mr. Hudson spent the 
night with appellant approximately once a 
week. There was testimony that Mr. Hud-
son left some clothes at appellant's house 
and that she did some of his laundry and 
sometimes took clothes to the dry cleaner 
for him. Mr. Hudson occasionally show-
ered and changed at the house, particularly 
when he worked late and was going out for 
the evening with appellant Mr. Hudson 
maintained a separate residence, however, 
living at his parents' home. Although Mr. 
Hudson used appellant's mailing address 
for a couple of bank accounts, he testified 
that he also received mail at his ex-wife's 
address, as well as at his parents' home. 
There was no evidence that Mr. Hudson 
and appellant shared any assets or had any 
joint financial accounts, projects, or liabili-
ties. On several occasions, Mr. Hudson 
gave appellant money to reimburse her for 
the food he ate. He also took her car to be 
serviced at the car dealership where he 
worked. Beyond that, Mr. Hudson made 
no financial or tangible contributions to 
appellant or to her household, nor did he 
share living expenses with her in any 
sense. 
(1,2] On appeal, Mrs. Haddow chal-
lenges the trial court's conclusion that she 
was cohabiting with Mr. Hudson. In its 
memorandum decision, the trial court stat-
ed that there was no substantial conflict in 
the testimony as to the facts of the rela-
tionship between appellant and Mr. Hudson 
and that the controversy was whether their 
conduct constituted cohabitation within the 
meaning of the divorce decree. Although 
the trial court labeled its resolution of that 
question a ''finding of fact," the determina-
tion of whether given circumstances consti-
tute cohabitation requires the application of 
the terms of a court order to a given set of 
facta. This process is in reality a mixed 
question of fact and law, and we are not 
bound by the conclusion reached by the 
trial court See Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 
Utah 671 
_ _. 1 (1982). Moreover, in 
reviewing a trial court's actions in a di-
vorce case, we are vested with broad eq-
uitable powers. See Read v. Read, Utah, 
694 P.2d 871, 872-73 (1979). 
In reaching its decision, the trial court 
did not specify its definition of "cohab-
itation." As the trial court pointed out, the 
term "cohabitation" does not lend itself to 
a universal definition that is applicable in 
all settings. As a legal concept, cohab-
itation has been the determinative issue in 
cases involving validity of marriage, see, 
e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal.App.2d 874, 39 
CaLRptr. 400 (1964); legitimacy of off-
spring, see, e.g., Burke t>. Burke, 216 Or. 
691, 340 P.2d 948 (1959); criminal prosecu-
tion of cohabitants, see, e.o., State «. Bar 
low, 107 Utah 292,153 P.2d 647 (1944); anc 
statutory and nonstatutory termination ol 
alimony payments, see, e.g., Kaplan v 
Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387,441 A.2d 629 (1982 
(statutory); Simms v. Simms, 245 Ga. 680 
266 S.E.2d 493 (1980) (statutory); In r 
Clark, 111 Ill.App.3d 960, 444 N.E.2d 186' 
(1988) (statutory); Zipparo v. Zipparo, 7 
A.D.2d 616, 416 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1979) (nor 
statutory); In re Marriage of Vaseonello: 
58 Or.App. 890, 648 P.2d 1358 (1982) (noi 
statutory), as well as the enforcement c 
equitable liens, as in the present case. 1 
some extent, the meaning of the term d 
pends upon the context in which it is use 
Nonetheless, a majority of cases and sU 
utes that attempt to fix a definition 
"cohabitation" follow the dictionary defii 
tion, which is: 'To live together as hi 
band and wife." Black's Law Dietiona 
236 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Ninth M 
Collegiate Dictionary 257 (1984). 
Neither the word "cohabitation" nor a 
variation of it appears in U.C.A., 1953, Ti 
80, chapter 8, the statutory provision g 
ernlng divorce. However, language we 
lieve was drafted for the same purpose 
the cohabitation clause in the divorce 
cree is found in section 30-3-5(3), wr 
calls for the termination of alimony f 
ments under certain circumstances. 1 
section reads: 
ro*i*-ii 
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Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse shall be ter-
minated upon application of that party 
establishing'that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite 
sex, unless it is further established by 
the person receiving alimony that the 
relationship . . . is without any sexual 
contact 
Although this statute pertains exclusively 
to termination of alimony, we find it note-
worthy that the statute predicates termi-
nation of spousal support on a showing 
that the former spouse is "residing" with a 
person of the opposite sex. Once residence 
is established, alimony obligations are ter-
minated unless the recipient can show that 
the relationship is "without sexual con-
tact" Wacker v. Wacker, Utah, 668 P.2d 
533 (1983). This Court has already said 
that the residency contemplated by the 
statute is more than a temporary stay. 
See Knuteson v, Knuteson, Utah, 619 P.2d 
1387, 1889 (1980) (where it was held that a 
stay of two months and ten days did not 
establish a "settled abode" (quoting Web-
ster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 
2d ed.)). However, in neither Knuteson 
nor Wacker were we called upon to define 
sexual contact 
We also note that neither the record nor 
the divorce decree itself indicates whether 
the cohabitation clause was stipulated by 
the parties to the decree or whether it was 
imposed by the divorce court If the par-
ties inserted the clause, they gave no testi-
mony at trial as to how they intended it to 
be interpreted. If the divorce court judge 
inserted the clause, we are without benefit 
of his opinion in this matter since he did 
not hear this matter below and is now 
retired from the bench. 
13,41 We therefore decide that there 
are two key elements to be considered in 
determining whether appellant was cohabit-
ing with Mr. Hudson: common residency 
and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association. Consistent with our holding in 
Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389, common resi-
dency means the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their prin-
cipal domicile for more than a temporary or 
brief period of time. Sexual contact meant 
participation in a relatively permanent sex-
ual relationship akin to that generally ex-
isting between husband and wife. 
[5] We first address the aspect of sexu-
al contact As noted above, the trial court 
found that Mr. Hudson spent the night 
with appellant an average of once a week. 
The findings do not indicate how long this 
conduct continued, but the record does 
show that at the time of trial, Mr. Hudson 
and appellant had been dating each other 
exclusively for about fourteen months. 
The court also found that appellant and Mr. 
Hudson had taken a vacation together to 
Hawaii, "sleeping in the same bed and hav-
ing sexual relations," and that the couple 
had spent at least one night together in 
Elko, Nevada. So even if we disregard the 
possibility that sexual relations occurred on 
occasions when Mr. Hudson visited appel-
lant's home but did not remain overnight, 
we are satisfied that the findings below on 
this point establish the presence of a rela-
tively permanent sexual relationship. 
In reaching his decision, the trial Judge, 
who admittedly was hindered by a lack of 
applicable standards, placed considerable 
emphasis on the sexual aspect of the rela-
tionship between appellant and her boy-
friend and on the effect on appellant's chil-
dren of the exposure "to a bed and board 
arrangement between the custodial parent 
and a member of the opposite sex." Al-
though we agree with the trial judge that 
this case involves a sensitive situation and 
we are similarly distressed by the circum-
stances of this trial where the children 
were called upon to testify as to the nature 
and extent of their mother's sleeping ar-
rangements, we decline to predicate the 
disposition of the family home on such 
factors alone. The effect on the children 
of appellant's relationship with Mr. Hudson 
might be relevant in a custody dispute, 
assuming the requisite showing of substan-
tial and material change in circumstance! 
had been made, see Becker v. Becker, Utah, 
694 P.2d 608 (1984), but custody is not at 
issue in this case and sexual contact, eves 
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if extensive, does not alone constitute co-
habitation. A fair reading of the language 
of this decree regarding payment of de-
fendant's lien simply does not dictate such 
a result In this regard, we find per-
suasive the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme 
Court in a similar case dealing with an 
equitable lien triggered by a cohabitation 
clause in a divorce decree: 
We take it from the ordinary meaning 
of the term, and gather from the obvious 
thrust of the dissolution decree, that a 
sexual relation was part of the intended 
definition. Cohabitation, in order to ma-
ture the lien, was to be with a person of 
the opposite sex. On the other hand the 
sexual relationship was only a part of the 
intended definition, not the whole of it 
Another ingredient was dwelling, the fac-
et of residing or living in the residence. 
In re the Marriage of Gibson, Iowa, 820 
N.W.2d 822, 828-24 (1982). 
We turn now to the second part of our 
test for cohabitation: common residency. 
It is clear from the record that Mr. Hudson 
spent a substantial amount of time at ap-
pellant's home. However, the trial court 
made no finding that Mr. Hudson either 
spent any time at the home when appellant 
was not there or had a key to the house. 
These circumstances seem particularly sig-
nificant on the question of whether Mr. 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a 
resident will come and go as he pleases in 
his own home, while a visitor, however 
regular and frequent, will schedule his vis-
its to coincide with the presence of the 
person he is visiting. The language in 
Burke v. Burke, 216 Or. 691, 840 P.2d 948 
(1959), summarizes this point well. There 
the court noted, "Cohabitation is not a so-
journ, nor a habit of visiting, nor even 
remaining with for a time; the term implies 
continuity." Id, at 950 (quoting In re 
Wroy's Estate, 93 Mont 525, 19 P.2d 1051 
(1938)). Further, there was testimony that 
Mr. Hudson did not move any furniture 
into appellant's home or keep there any 
personal items other than toiletry articles, 
a few items of clothing that appellant laun-
dered or had dry cleaned, and one picture 
album. At trial, great emphasis was 
placed on the fact that Mr. Hudson brought 
the picture album to appellant's home and 
left it there. However, we fail to see any 
determinative significance in the presence 
of any one or all of these portable items in 
appellant's residence. 
Nor do we find critical the fact that Mr. 
Hudson left a van belonging solely to him 
parked at appellant's home for several 
months. Mr. Hudson testified that he had 
no other place to store the van and that he 
used it primarily for occasions when he and 
appellant took his five children and her 
three children on outings together. Since 
Mr. Hudson's children live with their moth-
er in a neighborhood close to appellant's 
home, we believe it was not unreasonable 
for Mr. Hudson to park his van in appel-
lant's driveway for a period of time. It 
appears that as Mr. Hudson claimed, the 
van was in storage at appellant's home, not 
kept on the premises for the convenience of 
daily use. On this point, we also note that 
throughout respondent's testimony on his 
two-week surveillance of Mr. Hudson's ac-
tivities, the presence or absence of Mr. 
Hudson's Datsun, and not the van, was the 
criterion used to determine whether Mr. 
Hudson was at appellant's residence. It is 
apparent that even respondent assumed 
Mr. Hudson used the Datsun for his daily 
commuting, whereas the presence of the 
van told nothing of Mr. Hudson's where-
abouts. 
Our review of out-of-state case law dis-
closes that in some jurisdictions a third 
element, shared living expenses, is either 
an essential ingredient of cohabitation, In 
the Matter of Marriage of Edwards, 73 
Or.App. 272, 698 P.2d 642 (1985), or evi-
dence of it, In re Marriage of Roofe, 122 
Ill.App.3d 56, 460 N.E.2d 784 (1984). Al-
though we do not consider the sharing of 
the financial obligations surrounding the 
maintenance of a household to be a requi-
site element of cohabitation, we do find it 
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay 
any of appellant's living expenses or con-
sistently share with her any of his assets. 
For example, Mr. Hudson did not contrib-
ute anything to appellant's mortgage pay-
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ments, the insurance on her house, or her 
utility bills. His occasional payments to 
appellant for purchasing food and dry 
cleaning his clothes were reimbursements 
and evidence an intent to bear his own 
expenses, not an intent to contribute to 
appellant's household. Nor does it appear 
that Mr. Hudson considered his van, which 
he purchased during the time he and appel-
lant were dating, the property of appellant 
He alone paid for the van and for the 
insurance on it We also note that appel-
lant and Mr. Hudson rarely used each oth-
er's automobile, except at times when Mr. 
Hudson took appellant's Oldsmobile to per-
form mechanical maintenance on it and left 
his Datsun in its place. 
In view of these circumstances, it is clear 
that neither appellant nor Mr. Hudson con-
sidered appellant's home Mr. Hudson's 
principal residence. It is therefore our 
opinion that the common residency element 
of cohabitation has not been established. 
Once again, the Iowa Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Gibson is pertinent 
The time petitioner's boyfriend spent 
in the dwelling was extensive, easily suf-
ficient to qualify as residence if time 
alone controlled. But the time was not 
spent as a resident He maintained a 
separate residence and shared none of 
the expenses of this one. He did not 
even have a key or freedom to enter it 
except when petitioner was present In 
simple terms he did not live there.1 
Gibson, 320 N.W.2d at 824. 
16] In reaching our decision today, we 
construe this divorce decree so as to pre-
serve what we believe to be the intent of 
the parties, while avoiding an interpreta-
tion that is guaranteed to heighten the 
tension between them and unnecessarily 
jeopardize the interests of the minor chil-
dren. Thus, we hold that in a case involv-
ing the enforcement of an equitable lien on 
the home used by the custodial parent, 
"cohabitation" means to dwell together in a 
common residence and to participate in sex-
1. In Gibson, the evidence established the stabili-
ty of the boyfriend's separate residence more 
clearly than did the evidence in this case. None-
ual contact that evidences a larger conjugal 
relationship. While we do find sufficient 
evidence of sexual contact between appel-
lant and Mr. Hudson, the facts as found by 
the trial court do not support a finding of 
common residency. 
Reversed. Costs are awarded to appel-
lant 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., con-
cur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result 
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I do not join the Court in reversing the 
trial court because the judgment is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is rea-
sonable and proper under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. In accordance 
with the time-honored standard of appellate 
review, the issue presented is best left to 
the determination of the trial court 
In reaching its conclusion to reverse, the 
majority applies a sterile definition of the 
term "cohabitation" which is not in context 
with the usage of the term in the decree of 
divorce. As was observed by the trial 
court, the term "cohabitation" does not 
lend itself to a universal definition that is 
applicable in all settings. This is particu-
larly evident in the instant case. Plaintiff 
is certainly "cohabiting with a male per-
son" at least on a part-time basis. 
The fallacy in applying such a sterile 
definition of the term "cohabitation" can be 
seen by applying the definition to a situa-
tion where one cohabits with more than one 
male person during the week or, converse-
ly, where the male person is otherwise oc-
cupied and therefore only able to cohabit 
weekly. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court 
(a iltrNUMMISYSTtMl 
theless, we are persuaded here that the evidence 
of nonresldence was sufficient to conclude that 
there was no cohabitation. 
COM*N Utah $7 GIBSON v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF INDUS. 
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8. Administrative Law and Procedui 
Catherine G. GIBSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRI-
AL COMMISSION OF UTAH, and De-
partment of Employment Security, De-
fendants. 
No. 20501. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 1, 1985. 
Worker who quit her employment with 
Internal Revenue Service sought unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. The Board of 
Review of Industrial Commission affirmed 
decision of administrative law judge find-
ing her ineligible for unemployment bene-
fits on ground she voluntarily quit work 
without good cause. Worker appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that worker 
lacked good cause for quitting. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., dissented. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
*»65t 
On questions of mixed law and fact, 
Supreme Court will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of Board of Review of Indus-
trial Commission so long as its interpreta-
tion has warrant in record and reasonable 
basis in law. 
1 Social Security and Public Welfare 
*»658 
Information that worker was forced to 
undergo operation directly related to her 
job stress could not be considered by Su-
preme Court, where worker did not adduce 
evidence of such compelling nature at hear-
ing or at any juncture on proceeding below, 
although she was admonished by adminis-
trative law judge to give all testimony per-
tinent to her unemployment compensation 
claims since she would not be afforded 
future opportunity to give verbal testimo-
ny. 
Issues not raised before administrath 
agency are waived on appeal. 
4. Social Security and Public Welfai 
*»402 
Worker lacked good cause for quittin 
her employment, where worker's reasc 
for quitting her job with Internal Reveni 
Service was that she had philosophical di 
ferences with Internal Revenue Service 
audit procedures which she found to 1 
unjust, and worker did not give Servi< 
opportunity to work out whatever proble 
led to grievances. 
Reed M. Richards, Ogden, for plaintii 
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for d 
fendants. 
PER CURIAM: 
Catherine G. Gibson seeks judicial revit 
ot a decision by the Board of Review of t 
Industrial Commission of Utah which t 
firmed the decision of the administrati 
law judge finding her ineligible for une? 
ployment benefits pursuant to section 8 
4-6{a) of the Utah Employment Securi 
Act on the ground that she voluntarily qi 
work without good cause. We affir 
Gibson had been employed by the I.R 
since September 1, 1978, when she w 
assigned to work in the audit division 
the Ogden service center in April 19! 
Prior to that assignment, she had work 
as a tax auditor and was "basically happ? 
Her duties in the new job included t 
review of computer-selected tax returns 
determine whether or not returns should 
audited. Under I.R.S. guidelines, tax 
turns were not selected for auditing p 
poses unless the audit was cost effecti 
Gibson felt that as a result, middle s 
lower income taxpayers were singled o 
while high income taxpayers were pas.1 
over for audit This attacked her sense 
justice and integrity. She develoj 
stress-related physical symptoms which I 
physician attributed to her work. Gib 
looked for other work, but quit in Octo! 
Tab 3 
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pay alimony until Joyce's death, remarriage, 
or cohabitation. The divorce decree provi-
sion reflects the requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-6(6) (1989) that 
[alny order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is residing 
with a person of the opposite sex. Howev-
er, if it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, 
payment of alimony shall resume.1 
In August 1993, Robert became aware that 
Joyce had entered into a relationship with 
Bill. Suspecting Joyce and Bill were cohabit-
ing, Robert filed a petition to terminate ali-
mony in October 1993, ceased making alimo-
ny payments to Joyce, and deposited the 
alimony payments otherwise due into an es-
crow account pending the resolution of his 
petition. 
The trial court found that Bill was not 
"residing" with Joyce and, therefore, that 
alimony should not be terminated. The 
court concluded that "residence" required 
"some sort of duration" and because Bill's 
sharing of Joyce's residence was for a tempo-
rary period of time, Bill was not a resident. 
The court did not make clear why it regarded 
the arrangement as temporary, a character-
ization that is somewhat curious in view of 
the fact it had gone on for some time and 
was still going on as of the time of trial, 
albeit with less consistency. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Whether Joyce was "residing" with 
Bill is a mixed question of fact and law. 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 
1985). While we defer to the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate con-
clusion for correctness. See id 
1. The version of the statute in force at the time of 
this action uses the term "residing" but makes 
clear that both residency and sexual contact are 
required to terminate alimony. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(6) (1989). The divorce decree refers to 
"cohabitation" as a basis for terminating alimo-
ny, as does the most recent version of the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (Supp.1995). The 
APPLICABLE LAW 
[2] The issue in this case is whether or 
not Bill "resided" with Joyce. "Common res-
idency means the sharing of a common abode 
that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief 
period of time." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 
P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). It implies conti-
nuity, not simply a habit of visiting or a 
sojourn. Id. at 673. In Haddow, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that Ms. Haddow 
did hot share a common residence with Mr. 
Hudson although the two spent considerable 
time together. Id at 673-74. The Court 
focused on whether Mr. Hudson traveled 
freely in and out of Ms. Haddov/s home. Id 
at 673. The two determinative facts were 
that Mr. Hudson had no key to the house and 
that he did not spend time there when Ms. 
Haddow was away. The dourt explained its 
focus on these facts as follows: 
These circumstances seem particularly sig-
nificant on the question of whether Mr, 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a 
resident will come and go as he pleases in 
his own home, while a visitor, however 
regular and frequent, will schedule his vis-
its to coincide with the presence of the 
person he is visiting. 
Id Furthermore, the Court determined that 
the presence or absence of Hudson's portable 
possessions in Ms. Haddov/s home, such as 
clothes, toiletries, furniture, and photo al-
bums, were not of determinative significance. 
Finally, the Court stated that the sharing of 
living expenses is not a requisite element of 
residency. Id 
[3] Although neither the presence of 
portable possessions nor the sharing of living 
expenses is dispositive, either may nonethe-
less be indicative of maintaining a shared 
household and be regarded as some evidence 
of residency. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 918 
(Utah App.1995). For example, while it is 
semantic distinction is inconsequential. Cohabi-
tation is comprised of the same two elements: 
(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal association. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). In this 
case, sexual contact has been admitted. There-
fore, we need only be concerned with the resi-
dency element 
PENDLETON \ 
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not important if the two share assets in a 
general sense, it may indeed be relevant if 
one party pays the other's mortgage, the 
insurance on his or her house, or the utility 
bills—actions which would be quite atypical 
for a mere visitor, even a regular and fre-
quent visitor. See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673-
74. In Sigg, the court regarded it as some 
evidence of residency that the two shared 
living expenses, ate together and shared food 
expenses, and kept clothing in the same 
home. Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918. 
ANALYSIS 
[4] In this case, the largely undisputed 
facts establish that Bill resided with Joyce. 
Although his job in real estate required much 
out-of-town travel, he stayed with Joyce nine-
ty percent of the time when he was in town, 
spending four to five nights during such 
weeks at her home. Bill had his own key to 
Joyce's home. He came and went from 
Joyce's home three to four times daily, even 
when she was not there. Joyce had ostensi-
bly given him the key so that he could check 
on the house to prevent theft and wrongdo-
ing by Joyce's twenty-year-old son, who lived 
with her until a "physical confrontation over 
drugs" caused him to move out. However, 
she did not retrieve the key from Bill or 
terminate his free access to the home alter 
her son was incarcerated a few months later.2 
Although the two main factors found by 
the Haddow Court to establish residence are 
clearly present in this case, namely that Bill 
had a key to the house and that he spent 
time there when Joyce was away, other fac-
tors support the conclusion that Bill was a 
resident in Joyce's home and not merely a 
guest. Joyce and Bill ate almost all meals 
2. Even though Bill maintained his own apart-
ment for a time, he rented it only one day prior 
to the filing of Robert's petition. The trial court 
suspected that Bill rented the apartment know-
ing of the imminency of the petition, questioned 
the "genuineness" of the lease, and discounted 
the significance of the apartment in its analysis. 
There is evidence to suggest that Bill used the 
apartment as more of an office than a personal 
residence. When in town, Bill spent only one to 
two hours a day at the apartment, checking mes-
sages and mail. Bill's nephew actually lived in 
the apartment, although Bill claimed this was 
only because it was a "very bad neighborhood" 
-. PENDLETON Utah l ( j l 
9 (UtahApp. 1996) 
together when Bill was in town—invariably 
at Joyce's house if not dining out. In addi-
tion, Bill kept clothing and other personal 
effects at Joyce's home. (He also kept some 
of his belongings at his apartment, some in 
his car, and some at the home of his es-
tranged wife.) 
A couple of factors relied on by Joyce in 
support of her position merit comment. 
While it is true that Bill did not assist in any 
way with the cost of maintaining Joyce's 
home, the sharing of living expenses is not 
required to show residency in this context. 
See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673. Nor is it 
dispositive that, at the time of trial, Bill had 
no clothes or other possessions in the home. 
The trial court correctly minimized this easi-
ly arranged fact, focusing instead on the 
several-month period preceding trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Bill does indeed reside with Joyce for pur-
poses of alimony analysis. This, combined 
with ongoing sexual contact, is enough to 
terminate Robert's obligation to pay alimony 
under the divorce decree. We reverse the 
judgment appealed from.8 
DAVIS, Associate P.J., and BILLINGS, 
J., concur. 
O | « Y NUMBER SYSTEM > 
<• * ****** VW ** 
and he wanted the nephew to keep an eye on it 
so that "nothing would come up missing." Bill 
slept at the apartment on only rare occasions. 
When he did, he was usually in Joyce's company. 
3. Joyce also claims Robert should pay attorney 
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1995), which allows the court 
to award costs and attorney fees incurred in 
defending an action for alimony. However, due 
to our disposition of this case, the claim for 
attorney fees is denied. See Carter v. Carter, 584 
P.2d 904. 906 (Utah 1978). 
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ed in the Wasatch Front region, no evidence 
shows that these jobs were actually available 
to Hoskings. First, nowhere in the report is 
there a meaningful discussion of the duties 
required in the occupations described. The 
report lacks any analysis of whether Hosk-
ings could actually perform the duties re-
quired in these occupations given his disabili-
ties. Furthermore, the report fails to show 
that these particular occupations are actually 
available, i.e., that the demand for such jobs 
has not been fully met by the workforce. 
Moreover, no evidence is contained in the 
report that would indicate Hoskings himself 
had a reasonable opportunity to be employed 
in these jobs, i.e., assuming some of these 
positions are available in general, what is the 
realistic prospect that an employer will 
choose a man in his mid-fifties with a bad 
ankle and other health problems to fill one of 
them? 
[13] Although the report claims to have 
considered "job availability" in the computer 
searches, no discussion as to what is meant 
by this term is contained in the report. In 
describing the second manual search, the 
report alleges that the four occupations 
found are "reasonably available in southwest-
ern or northeastern regions of Utah." How-
ever, the report contains no evidence that 
these particular jobs are actually available to 
a person with the same disabilities as Hosk-
ings. It is insufficient for Salt Lake City 
Corporation to allege that a particular occu-
pation is generally available to the public at 
large, without providing further evidence 
that the particular occupation is actually 
available to Hoskings. In other words, in 
order to sustain its burden under the odd lot 
doctrine, an employer must prove that an 
actual job is regularly and continuously avail-
able to the applicant, within a reasonable 
proximity of his or her usual residence or 
residences, and that the applicant has a rea-
sonable opportunity to be employed in the 
particular job.9 
Although we conclude that Salt Lake City 
Corporation failed in a more general way to 
9. Of course, the employer does not become an 
employment agency for the applicant. The em* 
ployer is not required to find a particular posi-
tion for an applicant, much less arrange for an 
interview. Rather, the employer must only prove 
meet its burden in this regard under the odd 
lot doctrine, we also conclude that the Com-
mission's finding as to job availability was, at 
a more technical level, not based on a residu-
um of competent legal evidence. 
The Commission based its finding that oth-
er work was available to Hoskings exclusive-
ly on the Intracorp report. However, as we 
indicated above, the Intracorp report is hear-
say. Thus, although this report was admissi-
ble during the administrative proceedings 
held before the Commission, it cannot be the 
sole basis for the Commission's finding. 
Rather, the Commission must base its find-
ings on legally competent evidence—a find-
ing cannot Be based solely on hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the statute regarding perma-
nent total disability in effect at the time of 
Hoskings's injury, it may have been improp-
er for the Commission to consider the Intra-
corp report on the issue of rehabilitation. If 
not, the Commission nonetheless erred, given 
the residuum rule, in finding that Hoskings 
could be rehabilitated. Further, Salt Lake 
City Corporation failed to sustain its burden 
under the odd lot doctrine to prove the exis-
tence of a regular, steady job that was actu-
ally available to Hoskings. Alternatively, in 
light of the residuum rule, the Commission 
erred in finding that Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion had met this burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's 
order and remand with instructions to rein-
state the administrative law judge's decision. 
DAVIS, Associate P.J., concurs. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs in result 
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that an actual job does exist in the usual resi-
dence or residences of the applicant and that he 
or she has a reasonable opportunity to be em-
ployed in that job. 
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Former husband petitioned to terminate 
alimony, claiming that his former wife was 
cohabiting with person of the opposite sex. 
The District Court, Salt Lake County, Ken-
neth Rigtrup, J., denied petition. Former 
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Orme, P.J., held that former wife was resid-
ing with person of opposite sex with whom 
she was having a sexual relationship and, 
thus, former husband's alimony obligation 
terminated pursuant to statute and divorce 
decree. 
Reversed. 
1. Divorce <3=>286(6.1) 
Whether former wife is "residing" with 
member of opposite sex, such that former 
husband's alimony obligation terminates un-
der divorce decree, presents mixed question 
of fact and law; Court of Appeals defers to 
trial court's factual findings on issue unless 
they are shown to be clearly erroneous, and 
reviews its ultimate conclusion for correct-
ness. 
2. Divorce <S»247 
For purposes of determining whether 
former spouse is sharing common residency 
with member of opposite sex such that alimo-
ny obligation would terminate pursuant to 
statute, "common residency" means sharing 
of common abode that both parties consider 
their principal domicile for more than tempo-
rary or brief period of time; common residen-
cy implies continuity, not simply habit of 
visiting or sojourn. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(6). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
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3. Divorce <s=»247 
Although neither presence of portable 
possessions nor sharing of living expenses is 
dispositive of whether person is residing with 
person of opposite sex such that alimony 
obligation would terminate pursuant to stat-
ute, either may nonetheless be indicative of 
maintaining shared household and be regard-
ed as some evidence of residency. U.C.A. 
1953, 30-3-5(6). 
4. Divorce <S=»247 
Former wife was "residing" with person 
of opposite sex with whom she was having a 
sexual relationship and, thus, former hus-
band's alimony obligation terminated pursu-
ant to statute and divorce decree, where 
person of opposite sex had his own key to 
former wife's home, came and went from 
home three to four times daily even when 
former wife was not home, stayed at home 
ninety percent of time when he was in town, 
ate almost all his meals with former wife, and 
kept clothing and other personal effects at 
former wife's home. U.C.A.1953, 30-5-5(6). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Robert Pendleton appeals the trial court's 
denial of his petition to terminate alimony 
based on his claim that his ex-wife is cohabi-
tating with a person of the opposite sex. We 
reverse. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Robert Pendleton and Joyce Pendleton 
were divorced in March 1991. Joyce was 
awarded monthly alimony. Paragraph 13 of 
the divorce decree states that Robert is to 
